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Abstract 22 
 23 
This study evaluates the impact of exposure to messages that emphasize the need for changes in 24 
individual behavior or in public policy to address climate change a b ed  a c a e 25 
c e   to an unnamed source.  We implemented a large survey-experiment (N=1,915) online 26 
 A a  Mec a ca  T  (MT ) a f  a  a a ed the presence of 27 
recommendations for voluntary behavioral changes or the adoption of new laws to mitigate 28 
climate change.  We found that, regardless of the source of the information, recommendations for 29 
behavioral changes decreased d d a  willingness to take personal actions to reduce 30 
greenhouse gases, decreased willingness to support pro-climate candidates, reduced belief in the 31 
accelerated speed of climate change, and decreased trust in climate scientists. 32 
Key words: climate scientists, communication, climate change 33 
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Introduction 35 
Climate change arguably presents the most challenging collective action problem the 36 
world has ever faced.  Rising global temperatures due to the increasing accumulation of 37 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere will fundamentally reshape societies, threatening economies, 38 
health care systems, and geopolitical relations.  It is projected that state-of-the-art behavioral 39 
interventions, such as providing targeted information to consumers about high-impact individual 40 
and household energy choices, could significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions in the U.S. 41 
over time (Dietz et al. 2009; Capstick, Lorenzoni, Corner, and Whitmarsh 2014; Stern 2020); 42 
however, such reductions may be difficult to achieve in practice due to a lack of public (political) 43 
support for specific pro-environmental policies (Druckman 2015; Nielsen, van der Linden, and 44 
Stern 2020; van der Linden 2016).  In this context, it is crucial to understand how best to promote 45 
high-impact individual and collective actions to mitigate the effects that will occur as a result of 46 
climate change.  How effective are direct messages that recommend changes in personal behavior 47 
or the enactment of new laws to reduce emissions?  Does the impact of such a message depend on 48 
the presence of an expert source linked to the recommendations?  49 
A large body of research has accumulated which shows that exposure to strategic frames 50 
and persuasive messages can influence perceptions and willingness to support various actions to 51 
address climate change (Bolsen and Shapiro 2017; Druckman and McGrath 2019; Hart and 52 
Feldman 2016; van der Linden 2017); however, few studies have investigated the impact of 53 
exposure to messages that recommend specific changes in individual behaviors such as reducing 54 
beef consumption or cutting back on air travel as ways to reduce global carbon emissions 55 
(Nielson, Clayton et al. 2020), as well as collective policies such as increasing taxes on carbon 56 
emissions and increasing vehicle fuel efficiency requirements.  Do people become more willing to 57 
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change their behaviors or support specific pro-climate candidates and policies following exposure 58 
to framed messages emphasizing the need for such actions?  When climate scientists engage in 59 
a  a  be e ed a  political advocacy  b  ec e d  ec f c , does this 60 
have an impact on the degree to which the public trusts them to provide impartial and unbiased 61 
information about climate change?  Do the effects of exposure to such messages depend on 62 
d d a  c a ac e c  c  a  a e  a  de f ca ?  63 
The present study examines the response to framed messages that advocate both changes 64 
in individual behavior including, for example, taking fewer plane flights and using less hot water, 65 
as well as collective actions such as retrofitting buildings or halting deforestation to address the 66 
impacts of climate change.  Responses reported include willingness to engage in personal actions 67 
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, stated preference to vote for a candidate who would enact 68 
pro-climate legislation, belief that human activity is the cause of accelerated global warming, and 69 
trust in climate scientists.  To illuminate these relationships, we implemented a survey-experiment 70 
(N=1,915) e  A a  Mec a ca  T  (MT ) a f  a  a a ed: (1) e 71 
presence of recommendations for changes in public policy or individual behavior in order to 72 
reduce emissions of greenhouse gases; and, (2) the presence of a subtle source cue attributing 73 
these recommendations to climate scientists.  The experiment thus dealt with two aspects of 74 
climate communication: the differences in the response to a message recommending collective 75 
policies or personal sacrifices as a way to mitigate climate change; and, (2) the introduction of a 76 
source manipulation that attributed the recommendation to a generic climate scientist.  We find 77 
that presenting individuals with framed messages that advocate personal behavioral changes to 78 
combat climate change, with or without an expert source cue, reduces their expressed willingness 79 
to take action, decreases support for pro-climate candidates, decreases belief in the scientific 80 
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consensus, and lowers trust in climate scientists.  We address some of the implications of these 81 
findings for debates regarding how best to mobilize collective action to combat climate change as 82 
well as the role of climate scientists in policy advocacy. 83 
Solution Framing and Climate Action 84 
  T e c ce  f c a e ac  refers both to individual behavioral changes to 85 
voluntarily reduce emissions or support for government actions to accomplish this goal (Lubell 86 
et al. 2007; Zahran et al. 2006).  It has been estimated, for instance, that greenhouse gas 87 
emissions would be reduced considerably if consumers could be persuaded (collectively) to 88 
substitute meat and dairy with plant-based foods in their diet (Green et al. 2015; Poore and 89 
Nemecek 2018).  Yet people often hold misperceptions about the personal actions that would be 90 
most effective at reducing climate pollution (Bord 1998; Bostrom et al. 1994; Kempton 1991; 91 
Sterman and Sweeny 2007; Whitmarsh 2009).   92 
 When individuals are exposed to communications that emphasize specific considerations 93 
about climate change, such as recommendations to engage in climate-friendly behaviors or 94 
support pro-climate policies, they may prioritize the highlighted consideration when forming 95 
their opinion, often shifting their opinion in the direction of the message; this is referred to as an 96 
emphasis framing effect (Druckman 2011).  Prior research has found that exposure to messages 97 
that highlight descriptive social norms (Bolsen, 2013; Bolsen, Leeper, and Shapiro 2014; 98 
Goldberg et al. 2019; Mildenberger and Tingley 2019; van der Linden 2015), the benefits or 99 
costs of climate policies (Levine and Kline 2017; 2019), the benefits or costs of personal actions 100 
(Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook 2014), or the details of specific climate policy proposals 101 
(Buntaine and Prather 2018) can influence e e  willingness to engage in or support 102 
collective actions aimed at reducing climate change.   103 
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Despite robust empirical findings showing the direct impact of messages on changing both 104 
attitudes and behavior in the direction of the message (Chong and Druckman 2007), there are also 105 
several reasons why specific types of messages might not be effective.  First, most people value 106 
freedom of choice, particularly in decisions they make in their everyday lives (Permuter et al 107 
1980; Fujiwara et al. 2013). Several empirical studies have found that a behavior change as 108 
personal as a change in diet is met with particular resistance, even among those who ardently 109 
favor action to mitigate global climate change (Attari et al. 2011; DeBoer et al 2013).  Several 110 
factors may come into this resista ce b  a  e   e c ce  f c ca  eac a ce  111 
which may be triggered when people perceive their freedom of choice is impinged upon by 112 
directives from others (Brehm 1966; Gifford et al. 2011; Gifford 2011; Ma et al. 2019; Nisbet, 113 
Cooper, and Garrett 2015). 114 
Second, rather than take personal responsibility for an issue as large as climate change, 115 
many e e d efe  a  ea  solution that would not impinge on their personal 116 
behavior; even many of those who believe that climate mitigation is urgent would prefer that the 117 
producers rather than the consumers of carbon be regulated or taxed (Campbell and Sedikides 118 
1999; Hardisty et al. 2019).  The results of these empirical studies suggest that at least some 119 
respondents are more likely to favor more distant policy solutions that do not have a direct impact 120 
on their personal behavior.  121 
Third, addressing large scale collective action problems may require generating support 122 
for policies that have been politicized on ideological grounds because they involve the regulation 123 
of free markets or potential restrictions on personal freedoms. Surveys have shown that 124 
Americans are divided over support for public policy to mitigate climate change, with liberal 125 
Democrats as opposed to conservative Republicans more likely to support tougher fuel efficiency 126 
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standards and various tax incentives even if this means greater costs to themselves or their 127 
families (Nisbet et al, 2015; Pew Research Center 2018). Campbell and Kay (2014) have 128 
suggested that in order to protect their values and cultural worldviews, conservatives might not 129 
only oppose specific climate change mitigation strategies but also deny that climate change itself 130 
is a problem: in other words, when confronted with solutions to climate change that would pose 131 
regulations, supporters of free-market solutions will respond by denying that climate change 132 
exists, not due to their perception of the e e  e e  f the threat but because they 133 
oppose on ideological grounds the solutions that are generally proposed to address it.   134 
Fourth, there are questions about the efficacy of voluntary adoption of individual-level 135 
behavior changes when the earth is confronted with a problem as overwhelming as global climate 136 
change.  Even when people believe that climate change presents a dire threat and they 137 
acknowledge that behavior change by a large par  f e d  a  d e , e  a  138 
believe changing their personal behavior is futile (McGrath N.d.:16): a  individual voluntary 139 
behaviors in and of themselves to have no bearing on the macro political problem of climate 140 
change, which requ e  ba  c d a ,  e a  c e  (see also, Bubeck et al. 141 
2012; Hornsey et al. 2016; Kellstedt, Zahran, and Vedlitz 2008).   142 
Based on this literature, we pose the following research question:   Do messages that 143 
recommend personal behavior change or collective policies to combat climate change affect 144 
indi id al : (i) illingne  o ake e onal steps or support collective actions to address climate 145 
change; (ii) support for political candidates with a pro-climate agenda; and, (iii) belief in human-146 
caused climate change?  (Research Question #1) 147 
Message Source Effects   148 
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 A long and robust history of empirical research on communication and environmental 149 
risk perceptions makes clear that the messages are more impactful when they emanate from 150 
credible and trustworthy sources (Brewer and Ley 2013; Druckman 2001; Liu and Priest 2009; 151 
Lupia 2013;  Benegal and Scruggs 2018;  Bolsen et al. 2019; Van Boven et al. 2018).  The 152 
question this research poses is whether attribution to an unnamed climate scientist makes the 153 
e a e e  e  c ed b e a d , , a e a e , f c  a b  d e  affec  154 
the impact of the message.   155 
Linking recommendations for individual and collective action on climate change to 156 
expert scientists might influence positive response because of the high level of overall trust that 157 
Americans report for the scientific community compared with other institutions (Krause et al. 158 
2019; Mullin 2017).   In this scenario, trust in the scientific community should translate to trust 159 
in climate scientists when they discuss issues in their area of expertise including climate change.   160 
Alternatively, however, empirical studies have shown that this general trust in science or 161 
in scientists is not universal within the United States.  Instead, numerous surveys have found an 162 
association between conservative political ideology and a loss of trust both in science itself as 163 
well as in scientists (Hamilton, Hartter and Saito 2015; Krause et al. 2019; Leiserowitz et al. 164 
2012; McCright et al. 2013; Safford et al. 2019).  This distrust is exacerbated when scientists 165 
themselves engage in public policy debates (Brulle 2018; Milkoreit et al. 2015; Motta 2018).  166 
The tendency of political polarization around scientifically-based warnings has been documented 167 
most recently with respect to the Covid-19 pandemic (Ballew et al. 2020; Ellis 2020; Krause et 168 
al. 2019; Pennycook et al. 2020; Van Bavel et al. 2020).  169 
In a recent study, we compared the impact of climate scientists with party leaders and 170 
military leaders, and found that climate scientists had relatively little positive impact on the 171 
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perceived threat of climate change when the message was linked with a mild suggestion to 172 
e e e  eff c e c  a d e e ab e e e  ec e  (B e  e  a . 2019).  We f d 173 
that when information about the national security or environmental effects of climate change was 174 
attributed to climate scientists, this linkage often weakened the impact of the message for 175 
Republicans and Independents.  In the current study, we focused on the combination of specific 176 
packages of recommendations attributed either to a climate scientist or with no attribution to 177 
elucidate the influence of message type and message source.  178 
Based on this literature, we pose the following research question: When a message that 179 
recommends specific individual or collective actions to combat climate change is attributed to an 180 
unnamed climate scientist , does this attribution have an effect on he me age  im ac  or on 181 
the degree to which there is general trust in climate scientists to provide unbiased and impartial 182 
information?  (RQ #2) 183 
Methods 184 
We administered a survey over the period of September 23  October 1, 2019 using 185 
A a  Mec a ca  T   ec  1,915 e e de .1 Following a brief introduction, 186 
                                                     
1 MTurk is a widely used online crowdsourcing platform, producing a convenience sample that 
differs from the general population, but not in ways that impede making generalizable causal 
inferences (Levay, Freese, and Druckman 2016; Clifford, Jewell, and Waggoner 2015). Further, 
the results have been found to be comparable to identical studies fielded on general population 
samples (Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, and Freese 2015).   Sample demographics are included in 
Appendix table A-1. We restricted the survey to individuals who had completed a minimum of 
200 previous tasks on MTurk with a minimum approval rate of 95%. 
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respondents opting to participate were randomly assigned to one of six experimental conditions 187 
(see Table 1). These included: (1) a simple sentence stating that c a e c a e  a ea   188 
b  e e e  a d e a a  ec  f e U ed S a e  (No Source Baseline); (2) 189 
e a e e e ce a b ed  c a e c e  (Climate Scientists Source); (3) the no-source 190 
baseline sentence with an added a e e  a    ec e ded a  e a  d d a  a e 191 
fe e  a e f , d e e , ea  e  beef, e e   a e  a d ad  e e a  (No 192 
Source + Individual Actions); (4) the baseline sentence with individual behavioral 193 
recommendat  a b ed  c a e c e  (Climate Scientists + Individual Actions); (5) 194 
the no- ce ba e e e e ce  e a e e  a    ec e ded a  e a  a a  195 
adopt new laws that: limit the amount of carbon pollution in the air, stop deforestation, require 196 
business and industry to switch from coal to sustainable energy, increase vehicle fuel efficiency, 197 
a d e f  a  b c b d   a e e  a a  e e  eff c e  (No Source + Policy 198 
Actions), and (6) the baseline sentence along with the same policy recommendations attributed to 199 
a c a e c e  (Climate Scientists + Policy Actions). The experimental design was 200 
constructed to vary two dimensions: the extent to which the statement was accompanied by 201 
recommendations concerning personal behavior or policy changes, and whether or not the 202 
statement was attributed to a climate scientist or no source. 203 
   204 
[Insert Table 1 here] 205 
Dependent Variables 206 
We measured how exposure to the experimental treatments affected respondent beliefs on 207 
four key outcome measures.  After respondents had read the headline or short paragraph, they 208 
were asked:   a e   a e e     fe a  d ed ce ee e a  209 
e  a  a a   f  c a e c a e?   a 7-point response scale (1=strongly unwilling; 210 
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7=strongly willing).  The second question was,   a e   e f  ca d da e   211 
favor greater regulation of carbon emissions by business and industry, and higher taxes on carbon 212 
e e ?   a 7-point response scale (1=strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). Third, 213 
e de  e e a ed e e e   c  e  a eed  d a eed  e a e e , c a e 214 
c a e  cc  fa e   beca e f a  ac :   a 7-point response scale (1= 215 
strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree).   Finally, they were asked  c  d  a  a  216 
  c a e c e   de acc a e a d a a  f a ?  (1=strongly distrust; 217 
7=strongly trust).  Since so much of the previous survey research has found robust effects of 218 
political party identification with their response to climate information, we also analyzed the 219 
impacts of political partisanship.   220 
Results 221 
To test our research questions, we estimated a series of OLS regression models. In each 222 
model we omit the No Source Baseline condition as our reference group and regress the 223 
dependent variable on the condition indicators. For each dependent variable, we first report the 224 
full main effects model using all respondents in the sample. Following this, we present a series of 225 
subset models restricting the analysis to 1) Republicans, 2) Independents, and 3) Democrats in 226 
the sample. In all models,  cell entries contain OLS coefficients representing the difference in 227 
means between the treatment condition and the No Source Baseline condition. Standard errors 228 
are presented in parentheses below, and two-tailed p-values are reported alongside the coefficient 229 
estimates.2   230 
Personal action 231 
                                                     
2 Additional analyses, including the results of a balance test and sample demographics are 
available in the Appendix. A comprehensive test of source effects is presented in the Appendix. 
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The first effect that we analyzed was willingness to take personal action as indicated by 232 
e e  e e : H   a e   a e e     fe a  d ed ce 233 
greenhouse gas emissions as a way to fight climate change?  Changes might include driving 234 
conventional cars alone less, conserving energy in your e,  c a   d e .   As shown 235 
in Table 2, when no source  was linked with suggestions for making behavioral changes (NS 236 
Individual Action), the effect was to reduce willingness to take action (b = -0.31, p=0.01); in 237 
other words, the difference in the mean score of those exposed to this treatment as compared 238 
with the baseline group was one-third of a point on the seven-point scale.  None of the other 239 
conditions elicted a statistically significant effect at conventional levels in the full model.   240 
Further, in our analyses of partisan groups, no estimates reach statistical signifiancce at p<0.05.  241 
 242 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 243 
Preference for political candidates that support climate mitigation 244 
 We next analyzed the responses to the e : How willing are you to vote for 245 
candidates who favor greater regulation of carbon emissions by business and industry, and higher 246 
a e   ca b  e e ?   N e a   e  d e   a  f  c a e   e a  be a  247 
a d  a c a c ea  delegation of responsibility.  Shown in Table 3, when the treatment 248 
was linked with individual behavioral change and came either from no source (NS Individual 249 
Action) or an unnamed climate scientist (CS Individual Action), the response was negative: the 250 
respondents were significantly less likely (NS Individual Action, b = -0.42, p = 0.003; CS 251 
Individual Action, b = -0.51, p = 0.00) than the No Source Baseline group to respond that they 252 
would vote for a candidate that supports climate mitigation. There were similar negative effects 253 
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for both the general climate scientists source (b = -0.26, p = 0.06) and the no source policy 254 
action conditions (NS Policy Action (b = -0.26, p = 0.07.) 255 
 Across the party groups, only the Independents showed treatment effects across a broader 256 
range of conditions: when individual action or policy changes were suggested either by no source 257 
or by a climate scientist, Independents stated that they were significantly less likely to vote for 258 
candidates supporting climate legislation than their co-partisans in the baseline. For 259 
Independents, the only condition that did not elicit a statistically significant response was the 260 
addition of a climate scientist source (CS Source) to the baseline statement.   261 
[Insert Table 3 here] 262 
Accelerated anthropogenic climate change 263 
  The treatments did not specifically address the issue of the accelerating pace of climate 264 
change due to human activity but the responses to this question did vary in different message 265 
formats (Table 4).  Overall, when a ed T  a  e e  d   d a ee  a ee a  c a e 266 
change is occurring faster now because of human activity  ,  respondents were less likely to 267 
attest that the climate is changing faster because of human activity when this message was linked 268 
with changes in personal behavior either attributed to no source (NS Individual Action, b = -0.34, 269 
p = 0.01) or to a climate scientist (CS Individual Action, b = -0.38, p = 0.00). When linked with 270 
policy recommendations (NS Policy Action and CS Policy Action) or no recommendations at all 271 
(CS Source), there was no impact on the response.   272 
  Across partisan groups, none of the treatments had a significant impact on responses for 273 
Democrats or Republicans.  However, among Independents, the treatment condition did affect 274 
response: when the message was linked with climate scientists and either mentioned individual (b 275 
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= -0.71, p < 0.01) or policy changes (b = -0.64, p < 0.01), Independents were significantly less 276 
likely to respond that climate change is accelerating as a result of human action.  277 
[Insert Table 4 here] 278 
Trust Climate Scientists to provide accurate information 279 
 Our final set of analyses examine e effec  f e ea e   a e    c  280 
d  a  a    c a e c e   de acc a e a d a a  f a ?   281 
Overall, this message linked with suggestions for changes in individual behavior reduced trust in 282 
climate scientists both when no source (b = -0.34, p = 0.01)  was mentioned or when a climate 283 
scientist (b = -0.37, p < 0.01) was mentioned.  The policy recommendations had no effect 284 
overall on response. Among partisans, Republicans were less likely to state that they trust 285 
climate scientists when the message was linked with suggestions for change in personal behavior 286 
(b = -0.58, p = 0.04), and both Republicans (b = -0.62, p = 0.02) and Independents (b = -0.59, p 287 
= 0.02)  were less likely to trust climate scientists when climate scientists recommended changes 288 
in personal behavior. Among Democrats, those exposed to policy recommendations 289 
accompanied by a climate scientist source had higher scores for  trust in climate scientist (b = 290 
0.23, p = 0.04), while there was no impact from the remaining conditions.   291 
 292 
[Insert Table 5 here] 293 
Discussion 294 
This study evaluates the impact of messages suggesting the need for changes in 295 
individual behavior or public policy attributed to no source or to an unnamed climate scientist.  296 
We found that when messages ad ca e   c ba  c a e c a e that would require 297 
major changes in individual behavior, the general response was less willingness to support pro-298 
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mitigation candidates, a reduced belief in human-induced climate change, and in the case of this 299 
e a e de e ed b   ce , less willingness to take personal actions to reduce emissions.  300 
In addition, messages recommending individual behavior changes as a way to address climate 301 
change, with or without the subtle source attribution linking the recommendation to a climate 302 
scientist, reduced trust in climate scientists to provide accurate and impartial information.  303 
Messages that imply the need for individual sacrifices in living style that will be required to 304 
reduce emissions are thus translated into a negative response to the entire message, including an 305 
increased skepticism about climate science and trust in climate scientists.  Messages about 306 
policies that would affect others, such as taxes on industry and business or on carbon emitters, 307 
are more palatable and do not result in such a negative response.        308 
 Response to the messages was strongly influenced by the political identification of the 309 
respondents.  In general, support for various actions and pro-climate beliefs was stronger among 310 
Democrats than among Republicans in the no-source baseline condition.  Further, Republicans 311 
and Independents tended to respond more negatively in certain conditions if the message was 312 
attributed to a climate scientist.  This finding links back to the increasingly large set of findings 313 
that have demonstrated conservative skepticism about a variety of scientific messages, but the 314 
fact that the Independents reacted so negatively to these messages in our study warrants further 315 
study.  Our small sample size only permits conjecture about the ways in which Independents are 316 
responding, but the finding warrants study with a larger and more representative sample.  317 
Given the nature of our sample, we are cautious about the generalizability of our findings, 318 
and we encourage future work on representative samples to probe additional factors that may 319 
condition the impact of a wider range of individual behaviors and policy recommendations 320 
targeting climate mitigation efforts.   Future research should identify the specific actions or 321 
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policies that will be palatable to particular groups of listeners so that the entire process does not 322 
backfire.   We acknowledge that respondents may have been reacting negatively to portions of 323 
the message seeking individual action (e.g., changes in diet): future research should unpack the 324 
reactions to specific behavioral suggestions in order to tailor effective messages for diverse 325 
populations (Nielsen et al., 2020).   Respondents might also not connect recommended 326 
behavioral changes to actual reductions in global concentrations of carbon dioxide, and the 327 
framing of this connection needs to be explored (van der Linden 2016).  In addition, future work 328 
needs to extend our understanding of source effects, particularly those with ascribed scientific 329 
expertise.    330 
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Appendix 331 
 332 
(Insert Appendix Table A-1 through Table A-3 here)  333 
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Table 1: Experimental Design and Treatments 509 
Condition Treatment 
No Source Frame 
(Baseline) 
(N= 319) 
Climate change is a threat to both the environment and the national 
security of the United States.   
No Source +  
Individual Action 
(N= 319) 
Climate change is a threat to both the environment and the national 
security of the United States. It is recommended that we as individuals:  
x take fewer plane flights 
x drive less 
x eat less beef 
x use less hot water 
x adjust the thermostat 
No Source + 
Policy Action 
(N= 317) 
Climate change is a threat to both the environment and the national 
security of the United States. It is recommended that we as a nation adopt 
new laws that: 
x limit the amount of carbon pollution in the air 
x stop deforestation 
x require business and industry shift from coal to sustainable energy 
x increase vehicle fuel efficiency 
x retrofit all public buildings to make them maximally energy 
efficient 
Climate Scientist  
 (N= 319) 
 
Climate scientists say that climate change is a threat to both the 
environment and the national security of the United States. 
Climate Scientist +  
Individual Action 
(N= 319) 
 
Climate scientists say that climate change is a threat to both the 
environment and the national security of the United States. They 
recommend that we as individuals:  
x take fewer plane flights 
x drive less 
x eat less beef 
x use less hot water 
x adjust the thermostat 
Climate Scientist + 
Policy Action 
(N= 319) 
Climate scientists say that climate change is a threat to both the 
environment and the national security of the United States. They 
recommend that we as a nation adopt new laws that: 
x limit the amount of carbon pollution in the air 
x stop deforestation 
x require business and industry shift from coal to sustainable energy 
x increase vehicle fuel efficiency 
x retrofit all public buildings to make them maximally energy 
efficient 
 510 
 511 
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 512 
Table 2: Personal Action - Main Effects 513 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 All  Rep  Ind  Dem  
 Coef. p-val Coef. p-val Coef. p-val Coef. p-val 
NS Individual Action -0.31* 0.013 -0.51 0.059 -0.41 0.078 0.05 0.684 
 (0.12)  (0.27)  (0.23)  (0.13)  
NS Policy Action -0.11 0.362 -0.11 0.685 -0.16 0.505 -0.09 0.491 
 (0.12)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.13)  
CS Source -0.14 0.254 -0.40 0.148 0.03 0.902 -0.08 0.548 
 (0.12)  (0.28)  (0.23)  (0.13)  
CS Individual Action -0.23 0.066 -0.40 0.137 -0.23 0.331 -0.04 0.739 
 (0.12)  (0.27)  (0.24)  (0.13)  
CS Policy Action -0.13 0.299 -0.12 0.681 -0.46 0.053 0.07 0.597 
 (0.12)  (0.28)  (0.24)  (0.13)  
Constant (No Source) 5.58** 0.000 4.96** 0.000 5.47** 0.000 5.99** 0.000 
 (0.09)  (0.20)  (0.17)  (0.09)  
N 1906  505  551  850  
AIC 7071.0  2020.0  2074.4  2583.7  
BIC 7104.4  2045.3  2100.3  2612.2  
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses below. Two-tailed p-values are presented 514 
in the adjacent column. Coefficients represent the estimated difference in means between the treatment condition 515 
and the No Source Baseline condition. 516 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 517 
 518 
  519 
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 520 
Table 3: Vote for Candidates - Main Effects 521 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 All  Rep  Ind  Dem  
 Coef. p-val Coef. p-val Coef. p-val Coef. p-val 
NS Individual Action -0.42** 0.003 -0.51* 0.077 -0.53* 0.041 -0.05 0.695 
 (0.14)  (0.29)  (0.26)  (0.14)  
NS Policy Action -0.26 0.070 0.02 0.944 -0.65* 0.015 -0.20 0.142 
 (0.14)  (0.29)  (0.27)  (0.13)  
CS Source -0.26 0.067 -0.27 0.360 -0.42 0.108 -0.11 0.396 
 (0.14)  (0.29)  (0.26)  (0.13)  
CS Individual Action -0.51** 0.000 -0.47 0.099 -0.94** 0.001 -0.13 0.324 
 (0.14)  (0.28)  (0.27)  (0.14)  
CS Policy Action -0.18 0.222 -0.20 0.493 -0.76** 0.004 0.19 0.150 
 (0.14)  (0.30)  (0.27)  (0.13)  
Constant (No Source) 5.54** 0.000 4.33** 0.000 5.39** 0.000 6.29*** 0.000 
 (0.10)  (0.21)  (0.19)  (0.09)  
N 1911  507  552  852  
AIC 7705.7  2081.2  2215.4  2656.7  
BIC 7739.0  2106.6  2241.3  2685.2  
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses below. Two-tailed p-values are presented 522 
in the adjacent column. Coefficients represent the estimated difference in means between the treatment condition 523 
and the No Source Baseline condition. 524 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 525 
 526 
 527 
  528 
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 529 
Table 4: Climate Change is Occurring Faster - Main Effects 530 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 All  Rep  Ind  Dem  
 Coef. p-val Coef. p-val Coef. p-val Coef. p-val 
NS Individual Action -0.34* 0.011 -0.53 0.072 -0.35 0.146 -0.01 0.915 
 (0.13)  (0.29)  (0.24)  (0.12)  
NS Policy Action -0.12 0.355 0.13 0.670 -0.41 0.099 -0.11 0.338 
 (0.13)  (0.30)  (0.25)  (0.11)  
CS Source -0.19 0.155 -0.39 0.193 -0.03 0.889 -0.15 0.190 
 (0.13)  (0.30)  (0.24)  (0.12)  
CS Individual Action -0.38** 0.005 -0.40 0.170 -0.71** 0.005 -0.03 0.768 
 (0.13)  (0.29)  (0.25)  (0.12)  
CS Policy Action -0.19 0.162 -0.27 0.378 -0.64** 0.009 0.13 0.277 
 (0.13)  (0.30)  (0.25)  (0.12)  
Constant (No Source) 5.76** 0.000 4.65*** 0.000 5.71** 0.000 6.40** 0.000 
 (0.09)  (0.21)  (0.18)  (0.08)  
N 1912  507  552  853  
AIC 7452.7  2104.9  2131.2  2407.0  
BIC 7486.0  2130.2  2157.1  2435.4  
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses below. Two-tailed p-values are presented 531 
in the adjacent column. Coefficients represent the estimated difference in means between the treatment condition 532 
and the No Source Baseline condition. 533 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 534 
 535 
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 538 
Table 5: Trust Climate Scientists - Main Effects 539 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  
 All  Rep  Ind  Dem  
 Coef. p-val Coef. p-val Coef. p-val Coef. p-val 
NS Individual Action -0.34* 0.011 -0.58* 0.043 -0.36 0.143 0.03 0.771 
 (0.14)  (0.29)  (0.25)  (0.12)  
NS Policy Action -0.15 0.276 -0.10 0.737 -0.47 0.066 -0.00 0.990 
 (0.14)  (0.30)  (0.26)  (0.11)  
CS Source -0.07 0.586 -0.17 0.561 -0.06 0.806 0.02 0.880 
 (0.14)  (0.29)  (0.25)  (0.12)  
CS Individual Action -0.37** 0.006 -0.62** 0.029 -0.59* 0.022 0.05 0.681 
 (0.14)  (0.28)  (0.26)  (0.12)  
CS Policy Action -0.03 0.826 -0.07 0.818 -0.43 0.088 0.23* 0.042 
 (0.14)  (0.30)  (0.25)  (0.11)  
Constant (No Source) 5.53** 0.000 4.54*** 0.000 5.31** 0.000 6.21** 0.000 
 (0.10)  (0.21)  (0.18)  (0.08)  
N 1909  506  551  852  
AIC 7476.3  2080.4  2160.5  2395.4  
BIC 7509.6  2105.8  2186.4  2423.9  
Note: Cell entries are OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses below. Two-tailed p-values are presented 540 
in the adjacent column. Coefficients represent the estimated difference in means between the treatment condition 541 
and the No Source Baseline condition. 542 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 543 
 544 
 545 
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 548 
 549 
Appendix Table A-1: Descriptive Statistics 550 
 551 
 552 
 553 
 554 
 555 
 556 
Variable Value    N          (%) 
Age 18 - 24   199     (10.4%) 
 25 - 34   697     (36.5%) 
 35 - 44   488     (25.5%) 
 45 - 54   284     (14.9%) 
 55 - 64   171      (8.9%) 
 65 - 74     68      (3.6%) 
 75 or older       5       (0.2%) 
Female Male    681     (35.9%) 
 Female 1,217    (64.1%) 
Race White 1,409     (73.7%) 
 African American    195     (10.2%) 
 Asian American    136     (7.1%) 
 Hispanic    103     (5.4%) 
 Mixed race or Other     69      (3.6%) 
Education Less than high school     14     (0.7%) 
 High school graduate    179    (9.4%) 
 Some college    428     (22.4%) 
 2-year degree    240    (12.6%) 
 4-year degree    741    (38.8%) 
 Professional degree    275    (14.4%) 
 Doctorate      35      (1.8%) 
Income Less than $15,000    142     (7.4%) 
 $15,000 - $24,999    190     (9.9%) 
 $25,000 - $34,999    219    (11.5%) 
 $35,000 - $49,999    301     (15.7%) 
 $50,000 - $74,999    420     (22.0%) 
 $75,000 - $99,999    292     (15.3%) 
 $100,000 - $149,999    259     (13.5%) 
 $150,000 - $199,999      51     (2.7%) 
 More than $200,000      38     (2.0%) 
Political party Republican    507     (26.5%) 
 Independent    552     (28.9%) 
 Democrat    853     (44.6%) 
Ideology Conservative    557     (29.1%) 
 Moderate    503     (26.3%) 
 Liberal    852     (44.6%) 
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 557 
 558 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 No Source NS 
Individual 
Action 
NS Policy 
Action 
CS Source CS 
Individual 
Action 
CS Policy 
Action 
Female 0.08 -0.07 -0.15 -0.09 0.16 0.08 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
Minority -0.13 0.07 0.06 0.13 -0.10 -0.05 
 (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) 
Republican -0.01 -0.01 0.05 -0.10 0.14 -0.07 
 (0.17) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
Democrat 0.10 -0.21 0.11 -0.07 0.06 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
Age -0.02 0.04 -0.07 0.04 0.04 -0.03 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Education -0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.03 -0.04 0.02 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Income 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 0.04 -0.04 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Constant -1.50** -1.47** -1.38** -1.96** -1.93** -1.44** 
 (0.31) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) (0.31) 
N 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898 1898 
Note: Cell entries are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses below. 559 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01 560 
Appendix Table A-2: – Balance Test 561 
 562 
 563 
 564 
 565 
 566 
 567 
 568 
 569 
 570 
 571 
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 573 
 574 
 575 
 576 
 577 
 578 
 579 
 580 
 581 
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Appendix  – Test of Climate Scientists Source Effects 583 
 584 
 NS vs CS Source  NS Ind vs CS Ind  NS Pol vs CS Pol 
 Diff. p-value  Diff. p-value  Diff. p-value 
Trust Climate Scientists 0.07 0.557  0.03 0.858  -0.12 0.39 
 (0.125)   (0.144)   (0.137)  
Vote for Candidates 0.26 0.053  0.08 0.572  -0.09 0.558 
 (0.136)   (0.15)   (0.145)  
Personal Action 0.14 0.233  -0.08 0.535  0.02 0.9 
 (0.117)   (0.129)   (0.122)  
Climate Change  0.19 0.137  0.03 0.804  0.06 0.64 
Occurring Faster (0.128)   (0.139)   (0.136)  
  Note: Cell entries are coefficient estimates with standard errors in parentheses below. 585 
Appendix Table A3: Climate Scientist Source Effect   586 
An additional set of analyses examine whether, and to what degree, there is evidence of source 587 
effects, that is, the difference between a message attributed to a climate scientist as opposed to no 588 
identified source. We perform a series of t- e  be ee  e N  S ce  a d C a e Sc e  589 
S ce  e d  c a  e e a e c e . If e c a e scientist as a source of 590 
information were having a separate and meaningful effect, we would expect systematic 591 
significant differences in the means across the dependent variables.  The results indicate that in 592 
all but one test there is no statistically si f ca  d ffe e ce be ee  e N  S ce  a d 593 
C a e Sc e .   T  f d  c b a e  a d e e d  e c c  f     594 
(Bolsen, Palm, and Kingsland 2019), in that there is no impact of climate scientists as a message 595 
source indepe de  f e e a e  c e , b  a  e e d   f d     ac  f 596 
climate scientists as an information source across a variety of potential mitigation measures. 597 
 598 
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